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The German philosopher Immanuel Kant
(1724–1804) was the first to use ‘culture’ (Kultur) to
mean the whole intellectual aspects of a civilisation, at
the end of the 18th century. It was only at the begin-
ning of the 20th century, however, that the word
became generally used in that sense38. I showed in
Chapter II that scientific research, which aims at dis-
covery, is an intellectual activity. It follows that science
is among the intellectual aspects of civilisation, and is
thus part of culture. Within the context of this book, I
therefore define CULTURE**  as the whole intellectual
aspects of civilisation, including science. In modern,
developed societies, it could be argued that science is
not only part of culture, but is one of its dominant
aspects. However, science and culture are often
thought of as distinct, if not opposed, aspects of civili-
sation in modern societies. Why is that so, and what are
the consequences of this view?
Science and Culture 
At the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th
century, scientific discoveries created great excitement
in the general public. For example, the impressionist
school of painting developed from the chromatic theory
of light39; public lectures on such physical phenomena
as electricity attracted large audiences and difficult
theories such as evolution (Darwin 1859) and
relativity (Einstein 1905) were widely discussed in the
press, fashionable circles and philosophical groups.
Science was then part of culture. Deep interest of the
public in scientific discoveries progressively declined
during the course of the 20th century, as a gulf opened
between science and culture. Here are three examples:
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The theory of plate tectonics (Le Pichon 1968) is as
important in explaining Planet Earth as the theory of
evolution was for living organisms a century before, but
its appearance did not make a deep impression on the
general public (for additional details on the theory of
plate tectonics, see Ch. IV, Sec. ‘Scientific Theories
and Observations’). Similarly, the idea of a sudden
creation of the Universe twelve billion years ago, called
‘the big bang’, is not generally known or understood in
the public despite its imaginative name. Finally, the last
great scientific excitement of the 20th century was
probably the landing on the Moon and the first steps of
Neil Armstrong there on 21 July 1969, and that was
more for its human than scientific aspects; the key to
public interest in space exploration is the involvement
of human beings. Possible reasons for the progressive
widening of the gulf between science and culture will
be discussed below.
Let us first examine the present relationships
between science and culture at the international level,
in national governments and in universities.
On the international scene, education, science and cul-
ture are considered to be complementary components of
civilisation. The United Nations Educational, Scientific
and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) was created in
1946 as a specialised institution of the United Nations. Its
main objective is to contribute to peace and security in
the world by promoting collaboration among nations
through education, science, culture and communication,
as will be explained at the beginning of Chapter X.
Within  national  governments, science is seldom
associated with culture. According to countries or fash-
ions, scientific research may have its own Ministry or
Agency, or be grouped with such government activi-
ties as education, technology, industry or even com-
merce. Alternatively, research may be spread among
several ministries, with sometimes a more or less effi-
cient coordination structure, the efficiency of the coor-
dination depending on who actually controls the
research monies. That situation may be seen as favour-
ing scientific research, in the short term, because the
budgets allocated to culture by most governments are
much smaller than those going to research. However, it
contributes to pushing science into a ghetto, where it
generates little excitement in the public. I showed in
Chapter VI that such a situation might jeopardise the
long-term public support of research.
The situation of science relative to culture varies
widely in universities and schools of higher education;
examples of the latter include the various Institutes of
Technology in the USA, and the Grandes Ecoles in
France. At one end of the range, one finds universities
or schools that specialise in a single or a small number
of subjects, i.e. scientific, non-scientific—arts, lan-
guages, literature, etc.—or professional—agriculture,
business, engineering, forestry, law, medicine, and so
on. At the other end of the range, there are universities
that are composed of only two large faculties, i.e. Arts
and Sciences at the undergraduate level and Graduate
Studies, plus professional schools. In the mid-range,
universities may have several scientific and non-
scientific faculties and professional schools, on the
same campus. There exist a large number of interme-
diates between these three broad models. Hence,
some universities focus on scientific or non-scientific or
professional subjects only, whereas others integrate to
various degrees scientific and non-scientific subjects.
The previous paragraphs show that there is no agree-
ment in developed societies on the situation of science
relative to culture. Science may be seen as a utilitarian
activity, completely distinct from culture, e.g. science
put into Ministries of Industry or Commerce, or as the
complement of other activities that include culture,
e.g. science as the complement of education and cul-
ture in the UNESCO, or as part of culture, e.g. Faculties
of Arts and Sciences in some universities.
The general situation in international organisations,
governments and universities reflects the fact that, for
most people in modern societies, science and culture
are distinct, and even opposed, high-knowledge
activities (see Ch. I). Culture is often understood as
covering such activities as visual arts, music, literature
and philosophy, to the exclusion of science. In many
countries, most ‘cultured’ people would not only easily
confess, but even proudly state that they have no
understanding of science and no interest in it. In con-
trast, most researchers that I know have a keen interest
in such non-scientific activities as visual arts, music,
writing, philosophy or others, and several practice
some of these activities non-professionally.
The gulf that opened between science and culture
during the 20th century was already wide when
Koestler (1964, p. 264) wrote: 
‘The absurd division of our society into “two cultures”
produced the paradoxical phenomenon that the average
educated person will be reluctant to admit that a work of
art is beyond the level of his comprehension, but he will
in the same breath and with a certain pride confess his
complete ignorance of the principles which make his
radio work, the forces which make the stars go round, the
factors which determine the heredity of his children, and
the location of his own viscera and glands. One of the
consequences of this attitude is that he utilizes the prod-
ucts of science and technology in a purely possessive,
exploitive manner without comprehension or feeling...
Modern man lives isolated in his artificial environment,
not because the artificial is evil as such, but because of
his lack of comprehension of the forces which make it
work—of the principles which relate his gadgets to the
forces of nature, to the universal order. It is not central
heating which makes his existence “unnatural”, but his
refusal to take an interest in the principles behind it. By
being entirely dependent on science, yet closing his mind
to it, he leads the life of an urban barbarian.’ 
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Despite the numerous popular books and magazines
as well as radio and television programmes on science
and technology, I am afraid that the situation has not
really improved since the 1960s (see Ch. VI).
The above ‘…absurd division of our society into two
cultures…’ is all the more difficult to understand or
accept because the two groups of creators, in science
and arts, are actually close to each other. As explained
by Koestler (1964, p. 329), on the one hand, ‘…every
scientific discovery gives rise, in the connoisseur, to the
experience of beauty, because the solution of the prob-
lem creates harmony out of dissonance; and vice-
versa, the experience of beauty can occur only if the
intellect endorses the validity of the operation—what-
ever its nature—designed to elicit the experience’. On
the other hand, 
‘…painters and sculptors, not to mention architects, have
always been guided, and often obsessed, by scientific
and pseudo-scientific theories—the golden section, the
secrets of perspective, Dürer’s and Leonardo’s “ultimate
laws” of proportion, Cézanne’s doctrine “everything in
nature is modelled on the sphere, the cone and the
cylinder”; Braque’s substitution of cubes for spheres; the
elaborate theorizings of the neo-impressionists; Le
Corbusier’s modulator theory based on the so-called
Fibonacci sequence of numbers—the list could be
continued endlessly’.  (p.329)
Hence, scientists and artists have much in common,
because ‘Beauty is a function of truth, truth is a func-
tion of beauty. They can be separated by analysis, but
in the lived experience of the creative act—and of its
re-creative echo in the beholder—they are insepara-
ble as thought is inseparable from emotion’ (Koestler
1964, p. 331).
Koestler (1964, p. 265) stressed
‘…one specific factor which is largely responsible for
turning science into a bore, and providing the humanist
with an excuse for turning his back on it. It is the acade-
mic cant, of relatively recent origin, that a self-respecting
scientist must be a bore, that the more dehydrated the
style of his writing, and the more technical the jargon he
uses, the more respect he will command.’ 
This is, of course, one of the factors that contribute to
cutting researchers from the public, but I think that the
main reasons for the situation described here are
deeper. As explained in Chapter VI, they include at
least three components. Firstly, there is the way society
and even researchers themselves think of scientists:
too often scientists are imagined—and/or think of
themselves—as very logical, highly trained and cold
individuals; in other words, scientists are imagined as
dull or even frightening people. Secondly, scientific
knowledge is generally seen as an immense and com-
plex body of firmly established and interconnected
laws which is almost impossible to penetrate. Thirdly,
research is often marketed as a primarily utilitarian
activity which is of interest for technologically oriented
people, but unbearably boring for non-specialists. This
situation is all the more dangerous because most politi-
cians have little or no knowledge of science, whereas
addressing the most pressing problems that confront
our societies requires some understanding of the pro-
cesses of Nature (see the next Sec., and Ch. XI).
The situation described above contains the elements
of a positive-feedback, downward process, as
explained in the remainder of this paragraph. The
three factors mentioned above—researchers are imag-
ined as dull or frightening people, scientific know-
ledge is considered to be almost inaccessible and
research is seen as a mostly utilitarian and boring
activity—concur to bring about a devastating result:
the public and young people withdraw from science.
As a response, researchers retreat into more speciali-
sation and isolation, which pushes the public and
young people to further withdraw from science, and so
forth, in a downward spiral (Fig. 34). This feedback
process would explain why the public response to
science progressively spiralled down, from general
excitement at the end of the 19th and beginning of the
20th century to overall indifference, except for a few
scientific fields (see Ch. VI), at the end of the 20th and
beginning of the 21st century. I am not sure that the
process I describe here actually took place or, if it did,
that the process played a significant role in the disaf-
fection for science. I am not sure either which factors
initiated the process; it might have been related to the
two World Wars (1914–1918 and 1939–1945) or the
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Fig. 34. Left: the public withdrew from science during the
20th century because, progressively, researchers were imag-
ined as dull or frightening people, scientific knowledge was
considered almost inaccessible and research was seen as a
mostly utilitarian boring activity; this led researchers to
retreat into more specialisation and isolation, hence a posi-
tive-feedback process and downward spiral. Right: proposed
upward spiral toward reintegration of science into culture, by
bringing back discovery and creative imagination to the
centre of research; this could start a new positive-feedback
process, and thus an upward spiral (Original)ESEP 2004: 13–23
intervening Great Depression (1929 to the end of the
1930s). Nevertheless, I am sure that the public and
young people increasingly withdraw from science.
This must be stopped, and reversed.
Possible solutions to the three problems cited above
are discussed in Chapter VI, and there are undoubt-
edly many other aspects in the relationships between
researchers and non-researchers that could be im-
proved. These solutions include: science communica-
tors and researchers themselves must show scientists
as true creators; science communication must explain
that the body of scientific knowledge, although for-
midable, is transient, and researchers must behave
accordingly; science communication and researchers
must avoid focusing exclusively or even primarily on
the utilitarian facets of science. In order for this to
occur, and thus permanently bridge the present gulf
between science and other aspects of culture, re-
searchers must change drastically the way they see
and show themselves. Such a new attitude will require,
in turn, a change in the training of researchers (see
Ch. V), which will result, among other consequences,
in attracting to science some of the bright youngsters
who presently avoid it. The presence of these new
people will contribute to modifying the way science is
seen by researchers and society. This will, hopefully,
initiate a positive upward feedback process (Fig. 34).
What I proposed in the previous paragraph is to
reverse the downward spiral, and start an upward
trend. I think that we could decelerate and stop the
downward spiral of the 20th century, and initiate an
upward spiral in the early 21st century by bringing
back discovery (Ch. II) and creative imagination
(Ch. III) to the centre of research. I am not sure how
my proposal could be put into practice, because those
who must reverse the present trend, i.e. the active
researchers, are themselves caught in the downward
spiral. I believe, however, that resolute, well-planned
action by a few people could initiate a movement in the
right direction, which may prove overwhelming.
The approach proposed here, if successful, would
reintegrate science into culture. This may turn out to
be crucial not only for the scientific community, i.e. to
attract bright youngsters to scientific careers, and
ensure the public funding of research (see Ch. VI), but
also for society as a whole, as mentioned in Chapter III
(Sec. ‘Significance of Creativity’) and discussed in the
next Section.
Culture and Eco-Ethics 
I explained in Chapter III (Sec. ‘Significance of
Creativity’) that the survival of our species might de-
pend on a new approach to the environment—called
eco-ethics by Prof. Otto Kinne (1997)—to be rooted in
science, knowledge and compatibility between Nature
and humanity. Interestingly, French Prof. Maurice
Fontaine developed independently a parallel proposal
for the oceans, which he called thalassoethics
(Fontaine 1995, 1997b), and US Prof. Edward O.
Wilson promoted a similar idea, under the name envi-
ronmental ethics (Wilson 1998), which itself stemmed
from  conservation ethic (Wilson 1984, pp. 119–140).
Because the world economy cannot continue to thrive
without ethical guidelines, Kinne (2002) extended the
concept of eco-ethics to economy, and called the new
concept econ-ethics.
ETHICS40 is the philosophical theory of moral; it pro-
vides rules of conduct and behaviour. MORAL41 is the
theory of human actions, as subjected to duty and aim-
ing at good. Because ethics takes into account intellec-
tual progress, it can change with time and its rules may
differ among cultures. Hence, the rules of conduct
based on ethics evolve. This is contrary to the approach
of most religions in which the rules of conduct are
often immutable, because their basis is dogma. How-
ever, there are as many sets of religion-based rules as
there are religions, and within a given religion, new
interpretations of religious traditions or texts some-
times lead to changes in rules of conduct. As a conse-
quence of the fundamental difference between ethics
and religions, the rules of conduct based on ethics
sometimes conflict with those from religions. Non-
believers may be interested in looking at religion-
based rules, because religions have influenced and
continue to influence cultures, and thus ethics.
According to Wilson (1998, p. 250), ethical precepts
are ‘…principles of the social contract hardened into
rules and dictates, the behavioral codes that members
of a society fervently wish others to follow and are
willing to accept themselves for the common good’.
Before focusing on eco-ethics, it is useful to examine
one well-known example of successful application of
ethics to everyday life: medical ethics. ‘Medical ethics’
is sometimes called ‘bioethics’, but as explained by
Fontaine (1997a), medical ethics is only one compo-
nent of bioethics.
It is now generally accepted that all steps leading
from biomedical research to the treatment of patients
must obey rules of medical ethics (Fig. 35, left-hand
side). These steps include biomedical research, the
interactions between researchers and companies that
make and market medical products, e.g. drugs and
medical equipment, the use of biomedical discoveries
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40 From the Greek adjective ηθικο s (ethikos), which means
‘moral’; itself from the noun ηθο s (ethos), meaning ‘custom’
41 From the Latin noun mos (plural:  mores), which means
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by companies, the interactions between companies
and physicians, the use of medical products by physi-
cians and the interactions between physicians and
patients. Double arrows in Fig. 35 identify interactions.
Examples of unethical practices during interactions
include: researchers trying to get funding or employ-
ment from companies at the expense of their scientific
integrity, or companies trying to convince researchers
to doctor their results; companies offering personal
advantages to physicians who prescribe their products,
or physicians demanding such advantages from com-
panies; physicians behaving unethically with their
patients, or patients requesting unethical acts from
physicians.
As summarised in the central part of Table 17, the
improvement of human health benefits from biomed-
ical discoveries. These reach patients through compa-
nies that make medical products, and physicians who
use these products or apply some of the discoveries
directly. If there were no external control exerted on
both companies and physicians, corporate or personal
interests could threaten the health of patients. This has
been understood for a very long time, as evidenced by
the oath embodying the code of medical ethics devised
by the Greek physician Hippocrates (from ca. 460
to 377 BC). The Hippocratic Oath was taken by those
about to begin medical practice more than two millen-
nia ago, and is still taken in many countries nowadays.
In modern societies, establishing rules of medical
ethics generally involves discussions among represen-
tatives of interested parties (associations of biomedical
researchers, companies, physicians, patients, etc.;
Table 18), and other specialists (social scientists,
philosophers, lawyers, and so on). Involving in the
exercise a wide array of people takes advantage of
their diversity of expertise and opinions; it also helps in
developing consensus in the community. In most coun-
tries, rules of medical ethics are embodied in national
laws and regulations, and some are part of professional
codes. Hence, medical ethics is not a matter of
sentiments: its rules are implemented with necessary
coercion by governments and professional bodies.
The rules of medical ethics often vary among
countries, i.e. among cultures. Medical ethics both
prescribes some courses of action, and forbids others.
Except for a few extremists who wish total freedom for
themselves (often dictated by greed), most biomedical
researchers, companies that make medical products
and physicians realise that the absence of medical
ethics would threaten not only the patients but also
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Fig. 35. Roles of medical ethics (left) in controlling the steps
from biomedical research to the treatment of patients, and of
eco-ethics (right) in the steps from scientific research to
humans. Solid arrows identify interactions (double arrows)
and unidirectional actions (single arrows). Dashed arrows
refer to the role of ethics (Original)
Human health Human progress and survival
Knowledge base Biomedical discoveries Natural sciences discoveries
Users of knowledge Companies (drugs,  Environment users (companies, 
medical equipment, etc.) communities, farmers, etc.)
Actors Physicians Environment
Threatened party Patients Humans
Controlling the  Medical ethics Eco-ethics
threat
Representatives of  Associations of bio- Scientific, professional and 
parties medical researchers,  industrial associations, environ-
companies, physicians  mentalists and politicians
and patients
Other specialists Social scientists, philo- Social scientists, philosophers, 
sophers, lawyers lawyers
Coercion National laws and regula- International treaties, national 
tions, professional codes laws, professional codes
Table 17. Role of medical ethics in improving human health, and possible role of eco-ethics in ensuring human progress and survivalESEP 2004: 13–23
their own professions. I suspect that a similar, realistic
reasoning, and not only or primarily idealism, led to
the Hippocratic Oath, twenty-four hundred years ago,
because the Hippocratics, who devised wonderfully
precise rules of medical ethics, were not idealists but
followed a materialist philosophy.
Concerning eco-ethics, we know that humans are
presently modifying the environment of Planet Earth at
an accelerating pace, which threatens the very sur-
vival of the human species. Professors Fontaine (1995,
1997b), Kinne (1997, 2003) and Wilson (1998), and the
Eco-Ethics International Union (EEIU42) proposed that
ethics provides the approach to face that major treat.
Wilson (1998) assigned two major targets to environ-
mental ethics: sustainable development and conserva-
tion. He thought that each technological advance in
reducing the risk of short-term environmental and eco-
nomic catastrophe is a prosthesis, which creates a cor-
responding long-term risk. For him, the first target of
environmental ethics must be ‘…to expand resources
and improve the quality of life for as many people as
heedless population growth forces upon Earth, and do
it with minimal prosthetic dependence’ (p. 289). The
second target of ethics must be ‘…preserving the
Creation by taking as much of the rest of life with us as
possible’ (p. 292) in the passage through the present
environmental bottleneck.
As far as I know, there is no formal definition of ECO-
ETHICS or environmental ethics. I propose to define it as
follows: the theory of human actions, as subjected to
duty toward Nature—to which humans belong—and
aiming at compatibility between Nature and humanity,
which provides rules of conduct and behaviour for
interacting with the natural environment. It must be
remembered that Nature consists of the physical envi-
ronment and living organisms, including human
beings (Ch. II, Sec. ‘The Nature of Scientific Discov-
ery’). The definition of eco-ethics stresses the fact that
human beings both belong to Nature and often act on
the natural environment as if they were not part of
Nature. This almost schizophrenic attitude is largely
responsible for the problems discussed here. In the
remainder of this Section, I will analyse the idea of
eco-ethics and discuss how I think it could be
implemented.
Fig. 35 compares the roles of medical ethics (left-
hand side) in controlling the steps from biomedical
research to the treatment of patients (discussed above),
and of eco-ethics (right-hand side) in controlling the
steps linking scientific research to humans. The steps
involved in eco-ethics include scientific research, the
interactions between researchers and those who use
the environment, the utilisation of scientific discoveries
by the environment users, the action of users on the
environment and the action of the environment on
human beings. 
The two sides of Fig. 35 show major differences. On
the left (medical ethics), all steps are tightly coupled by
interactions (double arrows). In order to remain in
operation, such a coupled system must have well-
defined rules, which probably explains why medical
ethics appeared early in human civilisations. On the
right (eco-ethics), only two of the steps are interacting
(i.e. double arrow between scientific research and
users), whereas the other steps are characterised by
unilateral actions (single arrows). Because of the
absence of a tight coupling of the various steps that
link scientific research to humans when dealing with
the environment, the system has been operating until
now without ethics rules. Eco-ethics is appearing now
because an increasing number of people realise that
the build-up of environmental problems is threatening
the very survival of our species. I will first discuss the
single interaction and the two unidirectional actions on
the right-hand side of Fig. 35, before examining the
possible role of eco-ethics.
The interaction between researchers and those who
use the environment sometimes leads to unethical
practices, e.g. researchers trying to get funding or
employment from users at the expense of their
scientific integrity, or users trying to utilise scientific
18
42 The Internet address of the Eco-Ethics International Union
is:  http://www.eeiu.org. See also the electronic journal
Ethics in Science and Environmental Politics:  http://
www.esep.de
Parties Representatives 
Knowledge base Biomedical researchers Associations of biomedical 
researchers
Users of knowledge Companies (drugs, medical  Company associations
equipment, etc.)
Actors Physicians Physician associations
Threatened party Patients Patient associations
Table 18. Parties involved in the improvement of human health, and their representatives for establishing the rules of medical ethicsLegendre: Science, culture and (eco-)ethics
discoveries for purposes unacceptable to researchers.
Hence, there are rules in many countries or profes-
sional associations that govern this interaction. The
situation is very different for the two unidirectional
actions.
The first unidirectional action is that of users on the
environment. Western culture, among others, consid-
ers that the natural environment can be used freely for
the benefit of human beings, forgetting that humans
are themselves part of Nature. However ‘…the truth is
that we never conquered the world, never understood
it; we only think we have control’ (Wilson 1984, p. 139).
Of course, we preserve some parts of the natural envi-
ronment, which are relatively small, for both future
generations and our present enjoyment, e.g. parks,
with the feeling that this ‘good deed’ in favour of
Nature allows us to use the remainder of our planet as
a supply of resources or a dump for wastes. This atti-
tude did not inflict large-scale or long-lasting damages
to the global environment as long as technology was
primitive and the human population remained small.
This started to change with the beginning of the indus-
trial revolution and the population explosion, about
two centuries ago. We now begin to see the conse-
quences of the exponential degradation of the natural
environment, caused by the combination of technolog-
ical developments and rapid population growth. This
occurred because of our unidirectional action on the
environment: in general, those who exploit the natural
environment do not suffer directly from the damages
they cause to it. Other people, often far away or in the
future, do or will suffer. Hence, the lack of direct,
immediate reactions of the environment on those who
exploit it explains why there are presently no ethics-
based rules of conduct governing this action.
Csikszentmihalyi (1997) proposed the interesting
idea that, for human beings, ‘…the power to create has
always been linked to the power of destroy’ (p. 320). In
other words, ‘…the main threats to our survival as a
species, the very problems we hope creativity will
solve, were brought about by yesterday’s creative solu-
tions’ (p. 318). For example, without improvements in
farming and public health, there would not have been
the population explosion that is a key factor in the pre-
sent degradation of the environment. It follows that
each discovery ‘…has a potentially dark side that often
reveals itself only when it is too late’ (p. 319). This
would lead to the law of history that ‘…the greater the
power to change the environment, the greater the
chances of producing undesirable as well as desirable
results’ (p. 319). Hence, ‘…the future is in our hands;
the culture we create will determine our fate’ (p. 318).
The second unidirectional action is that of the envi-
ronment on humans. The functioning of our planet is
controlled by a large number of feedbacks, which are
governed by natural laws. One relatively recent event
that I interpret in term of feedback concerns the
‘nuclear winter’ (e.g. Turco et al. 1983, Covey et
al. 1984, Thompson et al. 1984). It was hypothesized by
researchers in the 1980s that, if a major nuclear war
occurred, the numerous and immense fireballs caused
by exploding nuclear warheads would ignite huge
firestorms. Great plumes of smoke, soot and dust
would be lifted by their own heating to high altitude,
where they would form a belt of particles in the North-
ern Hemisphere, which might spread worldwide
within a few weeks. This thick layer would block out
most sunlight for several weeks to months, thus caus-
ing surface temperatures to plunge by as much as 10 to
20°C: a nuclear winter. The conditions of semidark-
ness, killing frost and subfreezing temperature, com-
bined with high doses of radiation from nuclear fallout,
would interrupt plant photosynthesis and thus destroy
much of the Earth’s vegetation and animal life. The
extreme cold, high radiation levels and widespread
destruction of infrastructures along with food supplies
and crops would cause massive death from starvation,
exposure and disease, thus reducing the human popu-
lation to a fraction of its previous numbers. Although
different aspects of this catastrophic scenario were dis-
puted by some researchers, the hypothesis received
support from Academies of Science throughout the
world. The last Secretary-General of the communist
party of the Soviet Union wrote: 
‘Scientific research... showed convincingly what human
beings faced in the event of a nuclear catastrophe.
Eloquent testimony to what might happen was expressed
in descriptions of a possible “nuclear winter”... Govern-
ments had to renounce approaches involving the use of
force, fraught with the danger of the destruction of
millions of people, if not the entire human race.’ 
(Gorbachev 2000, p. 174)
Recognising the ineluctability of nuclear winter as a
consequence of large-scale nuclear war was instru-
mental in bringing to fruition the first Strategic Arms
Reduction Treaty (START I), which was signed by
President George H. W. Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev
in Moscow on 31 July 1991.
By reference to Fig. 35, the release of smoke, soot
and dust in the atmosphere as a consequence of
nuclear war, and the subsequent deterioration of envi-
ronmental conditions for humans correspond to the
first and second unidirectional actions, respectively. In
the second unidirectional action, the Earth’s environ-
ment would have acted blindly on humans, who would
not have had any direct means of countering that
action. This example shows that the only way humans
can prevent or stop environmental disasters—for
humanity—is to modify their own actions on the envi-
ronment, i.e. change the first unidirectional action,
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because they do not have any hold on the second one.
This is consistent with the view of Wilson (1984, p. 121)
that ‘…the destruction of the natural world in which
the [human] brain was assembled over millions of
years is a risky step’. In the same vein, Lovelock (2000,
p. xx) wrote: ‘The health of the Earth is most threat-
ened by the damage we do to natural ecosystems by
agriculture, forestry, and to a lesser extent fishing, and
the threat is aggravated by the inexorable increase of
the greenhouse gases... we are part of the Earth system
and cannot survive without its sustenance’.
It is generally difficult for people to see how their
actions on the environment (first unidirectional action
in Fig. 35) are linked to the reactions of the latter on
them (second unidirectional action), because the two
types of action often occur on different time scales.
Usually, the actions of humans on the environment
take place on a much shorter time scale than the reac-
tions of the environment. A striking example, which
was discussed in the previous paragraphs, is the long-
lasting environmental effect of a nuclear war: nuclear
explosions would take place over a few minutes or a
few hours, whereas the Earth’s environment would be
damaged and thus make life difficult or even impossi-
ble for humans over centuries and, in some respects,
millennia. Even when the actions of humans on the
environment are in the long term, e.g. the steadily
increasing release of CO2 in the atmosphere since the
beginning of the industrial revolution, more than
200 years ago, most people do not relate their day-to-
day activities to the resulting changes in the Earth’s
environment (i.e. climate change, see Ch. XI, Sec.
‘Possible Solutions’).
There is also a spatial aspect to the above two unilat-
eral actions. In small systems, those who use the envi-
ronment are often spatially close to those who would
suffer from their abuses. In addition, because spatial
and temporal scales are not independent in natural
systems, the actions of users on the environment in
small systems may be followed rapidly by reactions of
the environment on the human community. For exam-
ple, in a small-lake system, farmers who would release
excessive amounts of fertilisers in the watershed, and
would thus cause eutrophication of the lake, are phys-
ically and socially close, and/or related to, or even
among those who use the lake, e.g. for drinking water
and recreation. In such a system, there is a potential for
spontaneous feedback and the development of com-
munity solutions, without the need for resorting to
formal rules of eco-ethics. In contrast, in large systems
those who use the environment are often far in space,
time and/or socially from those who would suffer from
their abuses, which can lead to the situation illustrated
on the right-hand side of Fig. 35. The resolution of
actual or potential problems without resorting to
formal rules of eco-ethics in some small systems
stresses the need for such rules in larger systems.
Combining the above paragraphs on the two uni-
lateral actions shows that, because the steps that link
scientific research to humans are not tightly coupled,
on the one hand, there is no immediate incentive for
those abusing the natural environment to treat it ethi-
cally, and on the other hand, humans generally cannot
protect themselves from catastrophic environmental
reactions. The catastrophes would be for the humans,
not for the environment. In that sense, the idea of
‘saving’ Planet Earth is mistaken, although generous,
because the Earth does not need our protection. As a
matter of fact, our planet does not need human beings
anymore than it needed the dinosaurs. In other words,
what we must ‘save’ is not the Earth, but ourselves.
Fig. 35 shows that the only way humans can avoid cat-
astrophic environmental reactions is to force ethics on
the unidirectional action of users on the environment.
This could probably be achieved through international
actions only, although incorporating rules of eco-ethics
in national laws and professional codes could be a first
step in the right direction.
The approach to eco-ethics described above is pri-
marily anthropocentric: ‘saving ourselves’. It is in line
with the opinion of Wilson (1984) that, even if people
have an ‘…innate tendency to focus on life and lifelike
processes…’ that he called ‘biophilia’ (p. 1), ‘…the only
way to make a conservation ethic work is to ground it
in ultimately selfish reasoning’ (p. 131). However,
some colleagues rightly pointed out to me that this is a
bare minimum. Indeed, there are increasing numbers
of people who think that human beings have the moral
responsibility to act as stewards of the biosphere, for
present and future generations. As a matter of fact,
many researchers feel a strong responsibility to the
living world in general (e.g. Salk 1983, Wilson 1984,
Klein 1992), which provides a complementary basis for
developing eco-ethics. I wish to point out that ‘saving
ourselves’ and ‘acting as stewards of the biosphere’
are, in fact, two sides of the same coin. On the one
hand, I think that most people can understand the
urgency of saving ourselves, and be convinced to
rapidly take steps in that direction. By raising the envi-
ronmental standards in a way to save ourselves, we
would improve the likelihood of survival not only for
human beings but also for most other species. On the
other hand, a number of people may prefer to base
eco-ethics on the idea of a stewardship of the bio-
sphere. By raising the environmental standards in such
a way as to save other species than our own, we would
improve the likelihood of survival not only for these
species but also for ourselves. Hence, the two
approaches are complementary, and they would lead
to the same rules of eco-ethics. The difficulty lies in
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finding a way to set the process in motion. Combining
the two approaches may be the key to success.
In the same vein, Wilson (1998, pp. 277–278)
stressed the facts that humankind has become a geo-
physical force which rapidly alters the Earth’s climate,
and the greatest destroyer of life since the Age of Rep-
tiles was abruptly terminated by the impact of a ten-
kilometre-wide meteorite on the Earth, 65 million
years ago. In addition, we may run out of food and/or
water in a few decades because of overpopulation. As
a response to the present danger, most people instinc-
tively wish to either re-create our Blue Planet as it was
before we changed it, or use technology to get free
from the laws of ecology, which are imposed by the
natural environment of Earth. These two dreams are,
of course, impossible, which leaves only one course of
action: environmental ethics. Wilson (1998, p. 287)
explained that many people and governments accuse
environmentalists of being alarmists, and prefer to
save efforts now by making the choice of not taking
action. However, if they are wrong and the environ-
mentalists are right, the price to pay will be ruinous. In
matters of the environment, as in medicine, a false pos-
itive diagnosis is an inconvenience, but a false nega-
tive diagnosis can lead to catastrophe. As summarised
by Wilson (1998, p. 297), ‘…we are learning the funda-
mental principle that ethics is everything’.
The right-hand part of Table 17 summarises how
eco-ethics could ensure human progress and survival if
the utilisation of discoveries in the natural sciences by
the environment users, and their effects on the
environment, were subjected to eco-ethics rules of
conduct. Such rules already govern the interactions
between researchers and some environment users, in a
limited number of countries, and there are a few inter-
national agreements that regulate the actions of users
on the environment, e.g. the Antarctic Treaty, which
forbids the exploitation of the Antarctic environment,
and the Montreal Protocol, which bans the production
of ozone-destructive chlorofluorocarbons. The very
existence of such rules shows that eco-ethics is not a
wild dream, and indicates what the general rules of
eco-ethics could be. By reference to the example of
medical ethics, discussed above, it is clear that
building eco-ethics will require discussions among
representatives of interested parties. These include:
scientific, professional and industrial associations, who
will represent the researchers and environmental
users, respectively; environmentalists, i.e. researchers
and activists, who will ‘represent’ the environment;
and politicians (yes!), who will represent the citizens of
Planet Earth (Table 19). As in the case of medical
ethics, the discussions should also involve other
specialists, such as social scientists, philosophers and
lawyers. The end result would be rules of eco-ethics,
embodied in international treaties, and possibly
national laws and professional codes. These rules
would be enforced by governments and professional
bodies. In some cases, the development of eco-ethics
rules at national and professional levels could be steps
leading to the necessary international actions. Cairns
(2003) provides ten examples of eco-ethics rules that
could be implemented internationally.
Eco-ethics appears so important and reasonable that
it should have aroused strong interest in the scientific
community, intellectual circles and the general public,
especially in developed countries where the function-
ing of society is based on exchange of information.
However, relatively few people have actively re-
sponded to the idea so far, although their number is
growing. How could this be explained, and perhaps
reversed?
I think that a major reason explaining the limited
involvement of non-scientist intellectuals and the
general public in eco-ethics, so far, comes from the wide
gulf discussed in the previous Section which exists be-
tween researchers and the public, and more generally
between science and culture. On the one hand, because
of that gulf, the general public and non-scientific intel-
lectuals are not really interested in social ideas originat-
ing from natural scientists, or at best they suspect these
ideas to be self-serving. On the other hand, because of
the same gulf, few researchers in developed countries
believe that they could exert significant influence on
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Parties Representatives 
Knowledge base Natural sciences researchers Scientific associations
Users of knowledge Environment users  Professional and industrial 
(companies, communities,  associations
farmers, etc.)
Actors Environment Environmentalists
Threatened party Humans Politicians
Table 19. Parties involved in achieving human progress and survival, and their representatives for establishing rules of eco-ethics
(based on Table 18, for medical ethics)ESEP 2004: 13–23
social conduct or behaviour, except perhaps through
political lobbying. For example, many scientific societies
in the USA have their headquarters in Washington,
where they actively meet and/or lobby senior civil ser-
vants and politicians. Interestingly, the idea of eco-ethics
seems to be slightly more successful in Eastern Europe
and some developing countries than in Western Europe
or North America. It may be that the gulf between
science and culture is not as wide or well-defined in the
first group of countries as in more technologically
developed countries. Whatever the explanation, the
progress of eco-ethics in the latter countries will require
very determined actions in the short term.
Some examples show that the international commu-
nity is capable of action when there is clear evidence
that humanity is endangered. I already cited the exam-
ples of the first Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
(START I), which largely resulted from the recognition
that a large-scale nuclear war would throw the whole
Planet into nuclear winter, and the Montreal Protocol,
which banned the production of chlorofluorocarbons
when it was suspected that their destructive effect on
the ozone layer could lead to a life-threatening
increase of ultraviolet radiation at the Earth’s surface.
The purpose of eco-ethics is not only to prevent the
occurrence of such catastrophes, but also to avoid com-
ing close to them, because at some point in the future
last-minute action may happen too late.
I think that one of the problems of present environ-
mental policy is that environmental researchers and
activists both aim at wrong targets. Environmental
researchers favour education, in which they advocate
a gentle, ethical approach to the environment
(e.g. Cairns 2002). However, as shown in the biomed-
ical field, ethics is not a matter of sentiments, and its
efficiency depends on the definition and implementa-
tion of rules of conduct. The latter sometimes requires
coercion. Environmental activists would like to save
the Earth43. However, as I already explained, the Earth
does not need to be saved: it existed more than four
billion years without human beings, and if we de-
stroyed the conditions necessary for the existence of
complex organisms or societies and consequently dis-
appeared, such conditions would probably be restored
quite quickly, say, within a few thousand years. The
Earth does not need to be saved by us, but we may
need to save ourselves from life-protecting Earth.
I suggest that the community of interested environ-
mental researchers sets as its central objective the
definition of eco-ethics rules of conduct. Once this
objective is clear, we should approach, as a commu-
nity, all groups that could become potential partners in
establishing these rules (Table 19). It should be clear to
all parties involved that no group alone has the exper-
tise to set the rules of eco-ethics. Because of the diver-
sity of interests among partners, actual agreement on
rules would not be easy, but it could be successful if the
objective of the exercise were clear: preventing cata-
strophic feedbacks of Earth on humans, resulting from
our disruption of major natural equilibria. The idea
could be appealing even to those who wish to ‘save’
the Earth, because their objective—bringing under
control our actions on the environment—is the condi-
tion for eliminating the danger of catastrophic natural
feedbacks on humans.
According to the above proposal, the community of
environmental researchers should approach potential
partners in other fields of activity with a clear idea of
the problem to address and a general agenda for doing
it, and it should clearly inform partners that the rules of
eco-ethics would be defined collectively by all inter-
ested parties, e.g. as is done in the case of medical
ethics. This could be a major step in reintegrating sci-
ence into culture, as discussed in the previous Section.
This would be all the easier if researchers showed
themselves to their partners as they truly are: imagina-
tive people, who do not think of themselves as possess-
ing the truth and who put the pleasure of discovery
before the utilitarian aspects of research.
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CULTURE. Whole intellectual aspects of civilisation, includ-
ing science. Back to text
ECO-ETHICS. Theory of human actions, as subjected to duty
toward Nature—to which humans belong—and aiming at
compatibility between Nature and humanity, which pro-
vides rules of conduct and behaviour for interacting with
the natural environment. Back to text
ETHICS. Philosophical theory of moral, which provides
rules of conduct and behaviour. Back to text
MORAL. Theory of human actions, as subjected to duty and
aiming at good. Back to text
GLOSSARY